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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Theoretical household models of time allocation (Mincer, 1962, Becker, 1965, Willis, 1973, Michael,
1973, Leibowitz, 1974, Gronau, 1977, Angrist and Evans, 1996, 1998) suggest that children may
have a larger negative eﬀect on the labor supply of women with higher education. In these models,
families maximize inter-temporal utility functions deﬁned over a set of commodities, which include
the number and the quality of children (the utility-generating characteristic of a given child). The
utility-generating commodities are produced at home with combinations of goods and services pur-
chased on the market and the time inputs of the household members. Utility is maximized subject
to the wealth constraint, which equates life-time income with expenditure on utility-generating
commodities, which are evaluated at their respective opportunity costs.1 The solution to the
optimization problem entails, on the one hand, the demand functions for the utility-generating
commodities, and, on the other hand, the optimal allocation of household members’ time among
leisure, market work, and home production.2 The derived demand for children is the underpinning
element of economic models of fertility. On the supply side, the optimal allocation of time allows
predictions about the eﬀects of changes in wage oﬀers, in non-labor income, in productivity of time
spent in home production, and in the number of children on the supply of time to the market, on
leisure, and on time spent in home production.
Women’s education enters these models through three channels: preferences, home production
functions, and wage oﬀers. There is little theoretical guidance on how preferences or marginal prod-
uct of time spent in home production vary across levels of education. On the other hand, women
with higher education have higher wages. Other things equal, higher wages have both an income
and a substitution eﬀect. The increase in income shifts the production possibility frontier outwards,
which increases consumption of all utility-generating commodities and reduces the time spent work-
ing in the market. An income-compensated increase in earnings has two eﬀects. First, it induces a
shift in consumption away from utility-generating commodities that are time-intensive and towards
commodities that are intensive in market goods and services. Second, it induces substitution of
market goods and services for time in the production of utility-generating commodities.
In this framework, the relative price of child quality is higher for more educated women, who
have higher wages. Other things equal, they will demand less and will produce it with more market
goods and services and less own time. As a result, children will have smaller eﬀects on the labor
supply of women with higher education. Other things are not equal, however, and therefore children
c o u l dh a v eal a r g e rn e g a t i v ee ﬀect on the labor supply of women with higher education under several
circumstances: ﬁrst, if more educated women have stronger preferences for child quality and if the
production of child quality is intensive in women’s time, with very little possibility of substituting
market goods and services for women’s time; second, if more educated women are more eﬃcient
at producing child quality; third, if the increase in education increases the marginal product of
woman’s time more than the marginal products of the other inputs into the production of child
quality, women with higher education will tend to devote more time per child to the production of
child quality and will produce children who are more quality intensive.
Previous studies of the way in which women’s education shapes the eﬀects of children on their
labor supply have generated mixed results. Early empirical evidence suggests children have stronger
1The opportunity costs of the utility generating commodities include the prices of the inputs purchased on the
market and the shadow value of the time spent in home-producing inputs and consuming the commodity.
2The distinction between leisure and time spent in home production (discussed by Mincer, 1962, and Gronau,
1977) as inputs into the production of utility-generating commodities is that leisure is an input with no market
substitutes, whereas market substitutes are easily available for time spent in home production.
2eﬀects on the labor supply of more educated women. Gronau (1973) ﬁnds that children have a
positive eﬀect on the shadow value of women’s time and this eﬀect increases with education; Hill
and Staﬀord (1980) and Leibowitz (1974) ﬁnd that time inputs in child care increase with mother’s
education and, as a result, labor supply of more educated women is more sensitive to the presence
of children; Mincer and Polacheck (1974, 1978) ﬁnd that the rate of depreciation of human capital
due to market-work interruptions is larger for more educated women and, therefore, birth related
interruptions have a stronger adverse eﬀect on the labor supply of more educated women. Two
more recent studies, Angrist and Evans (1996, 1998) and Hyslop (1999), found, however, that the
eﬀect of children on labor force participation declines with mother’s education.
This discrepancy could have been, in part, generated by methodological diﬀerences. Angrist
and Evans (1996, 1998) and Hyslop (1999) focus on the eﬀect of children on participation. If one
of the primary eﬀects of children on women’s labor supply is through the number of hours worked,
studies of participation dynamics will underestimate the eﬀect of children and, potentially, the role
of education. On the other hand, both these studies pay special attention to the endogeneity of
fertility decisions: Angrist and Evans (1996, 1998) used exogenous variation in the probability of
the third birth to measure the causal eﬀect of children, and Hyslop (1999) estimated a dynamic
model of labor force participation, speciﬁcally modelling individual-level heterogeneity.
This possibility notwithstanding, whether the eﬀect of children on women’s labor supply in-
creases or decreases with education and what is the source of the variation across levels of education
are important questions from a policy perspective. Economic and social developments that have
taken place over the past few decades led to a rise in the private costs of children incurred by
parents, especially by mothers, while increasingly making children a public good. Better job oppor-
tunities and higher wages for women raised the opportunity cost of children; the growth of transfer
payments, like social security or public health systems, and taxation of future generations through
reliance on public debt have raised the public beneﬁts of children.3 Moreover, recent economic and
developmental psychology literature suggested that longer periods of maternal care improve child
cognitive and behavioral outcomes.4 The existence of positive externalities from raising children
and from longer periods of maternal care as well as from mothers’ investments in their own educa-
tion and training creates the scope for new or improved public policy aimed at reducing the implicit
cost of children. The eﬃcient design of these policies depends on the accurate description of the
magnitude and the structure of the eﬀect of children on women’s level of labor market involvement.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the way in which the eﬀect of children on the level of labor
market involvement of married women varies with education. We use an econometric model that
explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of labor market and fertility decisions, for the heterogeneity
of the eﬀect of children on labor supply, for the correlation between the eﬀect of children and fertil-
ity decisions, and for the correlation of sequential labor market decisions. Sequential labor market
decisions, represented by a four-state multi-period multinomial probit, and fertility decisions, rep-
resented by a dynamic probit model, are jointly modeled in a mixed-eﬀects simultaneous equation
framework. Correlated individual-speciﬁcr a n d o mc o e ﬃcients included in the labor market and
fertility equations capture the variation in labor market and fertility behavior, the heterogeneity of
the eﬀects of children on the level of labor market involvement, as well as the correlation between
the eﬀects of children on labor supply and fertility behavior.
In this framework, women’s education aﬀects their labor market and fertility decisions through
two channels. First, expected wages included in the participation equations both by themselves
3Folbre, 1994.
4Waldfogel at al. (2002), Broogs-Gunn et al. (2002), Ruhm (2004)
3and in interaction with the variables describing the number and age distribution of children are a
function of education. Second, a set of education-speciﬁc random coeﬃcients captures the variation
of the labor supply, of the demand for children, and of the eﬀects of children on labor supply
across levels of education, controlling for own wage and other family-related relevant variables. We
estimate the model using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods and panel data from 1979
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). The 25-year (1979-2003) unbalanced panel we
constructed5 follows women from their entry into the labor force and captures almost complete
fertility histories. We use simulations based on the estimation results to compute the eﬀect of
children on women’s level of labor market involvement. We compare this eﬀect across levels of
education, and we study the extent to which these diﬀerences are generated by diﬀerences in wage
oﬀers or by diﬀerences in factors like preferences and productivity in household work, captured by
the random coeﬃcients.
Our analysis shows that women with higher education have fewer children and work more before
the birth of the ﬁrst child, but children have larger negative eﬀects on their level of labor market
involvement. Diﬀerences across education levels are signiﬁcantly more pronounced with respect
to full time employment than with respect to participation; in response to the birth of a child,
women with higher education are relatively more likely to move from full time work to part time
work, whereas women with lower education are relatively more likely to stop working. Other things
equal, higher wage oﬀers reduce the eﬀect of children on the level of labor market involvement. The
larger eﬀect of children on the level of labor market involvement of women with higher education
is generated by diﬀerences in the productivity of time spent in home production of child quality,
which are captured by the random coeﬃcients: women with higher education are characterized by
a combination of higher marginal product of time spent in home production of child quality and
higher marginal product of time relative to the marginal product of other inputs into the production
of child quality.
The policy signiﬁcance of our results is twofold. First, since higher wage oﬀers reduce the eﬀect
of children on women’s level of labor market involvement, public policies oﬀering higher parental
beneﬁts will have the opposite eﬀect — a larger reduction in the level of labor market involvement
following the birth of a child. Second, public policy that increases availability of high quality
child care and child care subsidies for working mothers could eﬃciently reduce the implicit cost of
children. Provision of high quality child care increases the productivity of market inputs into the
production of child quality; other things equal, higher productivity of market inputs reduces the
eﬀect of children on women’s labor supply.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the
construction of the panel data set used in the estimation and provide a preliminary, non-parametric
analysis of the way in which the relationship between fertility and labor market decisions varies
across levels of education. In section 3 we present the econometric model and the estimation
procedure. In section 4 we present the estimation and simulation results. In section 5 we summarize
and discuss the main results.
5The panel is considerably longer than those previously used in the literature. For example Hyslop (1999) uses a
7-year panel of continuously married or women, with husbands continuously working, to estimate a two state model
of labor force participation, Carrasco (2001) uses a 3-year panel of married or cohabitating women to estimate jointly
two-state labor force participation decisions and fertility decisions.
42D a t a
We study the eﬀect of children on the level of labor market involvement of married women using
panel data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). The NLSY79 contains
a representative sample of individuals with ages between 14 and 21 years in 1979, who are surveyed
every year between 1979 and 1994, and every other year thereafter. For the purpose of our study,
NLSY79 has two important features. First, it contains detailed information on respondents’ labor
supply history. Second, it contains information on the birth dates of respondents’ children and on
the beginning and end dates of respondents’ marriages. Using this information, we constructed
complete labor market, marital status, and fertility histories for each individual.
We use data from the nonmilitary sample of the 1979-2004 surveys and we exclude women who
live on a farm larger than 100 acres at any point in the period. Since we focus on the labor supply
of married women, we restrict the sample to women who are not married and are childless in 1979,
get married after 1979, and remain married until 2004, only have children while married, and only
have biological children in the household over the period of our data (this latter criteria eliminates
women who adopt children or who marry men who have children who live with them). Imposing
these strict selection criteria (especially the continuous marriage requirement) over a long period of
time reduces the sample size, circumscribes the scope of our research to a narrower set of experiences
and, potentially, leads to non-random selection of individuals with respect to unobserved traits that
are relevant to their labor market and fertility behaviors. The focus on married women, however,
is very common in the literature that studies the relationship between fertility and labor market
decisions of women (Carrasco, 2001, Hyslop, 1999, Angrist and Evans, 1998, Heckman and Willis,
1977, etc). The motivation for this focus is twofold. On the one hand, married women, specially
married women with children, have driven the dramatic change in the labor supply behavior among
women that took place over the past few decades (Blau, 1998, Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 1998,
Leibowitz and Klerman, 1995). On the other hand, underlying theoretical models (Mincer, 1962,
Becker, 1965, Leibowitz, 1972, Willis, 1973, Michael, 1973, Gronau, 1977, Angrist and Evans, 1996,
1998) are household production models. Our sample is in a way more informative than those used
in previous studies using panel data (e.g. Hyslop, 1999 and Carrasco, 2001) which contain women
who are continuously married or cohabitating for the entire duration of the sample. Our panel
is signiﬁcantly longer and, since we begin following these individuals when they enter the labor
market, we observe their level of labor market involvement both before and during marriage.6
In order to abstract from the trade-oﬀ between schooling and working, we only consider a woman
at risk to work or to have a child once she has been out of school for at least 18 months continuously
(once a women leaves school we consider her still at risk even if she returns to school). Finally,
we require at least ﬁve years of data for each woman. It is important to note that all women are
childless and have no labor market history in their ﬁrst period in the sample, which implies that
initial conditions are identical across individuals in the sample.7
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables used in the analysis. Panel A presents summary
statistics, by year, for the time-varying personal characteristics used in the analysis. Column 2,
which presents the number of women considered at risk in a given year, shows the unbalanced nature
6To test the robustness of our results to sample selection, however, we estimated our model with a sample that
did not impose the marriage-related restrictions. While the average level of labor market involvement is lower in this
larger sample, the qualitative results regarding the eﬀect of children on the level of labor market involvement hold.
7The sample construction is designed to capture complete labor market and fertility histories. Identical initial
conditions imply that participation and the number of children at the entry in the panel do not have to be explicitly
modeled.
5of the data. In 1979 only 116 women are considered at risk, by 1997 all 645 women are considered
at risk. Column 3 shows the proportion of women at risk that are married. Husband’s income and
income from other sources (columns 4 and 5 show averages per woman at risk) have been deﬂated
using the CPI-U and are in 1979 dollars. Since after 1994 NLSY79 was conducted every other year,
we imputed observations for the post-1994 missing years and several missing observations from the
available years; our exact imputation procedure is described in the data appendix. Column 6 shows
the yearly birth rates and columns 7 to 9 show the average number of children by age category, for
women at risk. No women had any children prior to 1981. In the last years of the panel, birth rates
are very low, which indicates that our data capture complete fertility histories for most women in
the sample. In 2003, the average number of children was 1.8, and the average numbers of children
for each age category were 0.05 for ages 0 to 1, 0.14 for ages 2 to 4, and 1.61 for 5 years older.
We represent the labor market decisions using a model with four states — full time, full time
part year, part time, and nonwork. This model provides a more accurate description of the level
of labor market involvement than the two- or three-state models previously used in the literature.
As we will show, a majority of women work full time before the birth of the ﬁrst child. Longer
or shorter birth-related interruptions are followed by a return to full-time work, a switch to part-
time work, or a longer period of market inactivity. Many birth-related interruptions, specially the
shorter ones, are the result of women using accumulated vacation time, sick leave, formal maternity
leave, and unpaid leave before returning to work, which helps women avoid the loss of job-search
costs, ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital, and match-speciﬁc information.8 In a two-state model (work,
nonwork) in which labor market states are deﬁned using hours worked in a given year, as is the case
in this paper and in most of the previous literature, women who return to full time work after short
birth-related interruptions will be classiﬁed as working during the year. Therefore, the two-state
model does not capture the variation in the number of hours, which may represent a signiﬁcant
share of the eﬀect of children. A three-state model (full-time, part-time and nonwork) inaccurately
classiﬁes many of the years in which birth-related interruptions occur as part time when, in fact,
they are combinations of full-time work and inactivity (paid and unpaid leave), giving rise to a large
number of birth-related, spurious transitions to and from part time and, thus, artiﬁcially reducing
the persistence of the part-time state.
The empirical probability distribution of the labor market states of women at risk is showed in
columns 10 to 13. To be considered working a woman must have both positive hours worked and
positive income. Women who worked more than 1750 hours in a year are classiﬁed as full time.
Women who work between zero and 1750 hours, but who work on average more than 35 hours
a week, are considered full time part year. Women who work between zero and 1750 hours, but
who work on average less than 35 hours a week, are considered part time (we imputed missing
observations on the number of hours worked for several individuals; the imputation procedure
is described in the data appendix). Women who work zero hours or who have zero income are
considered not working. The percentages of women working full time and working full time part
year decline over time while the percentages of women working part time and not working rise.
Panel B presents summary statistics for the time-invariant personal characteristics and family
background variables that are used in the analysis: education, race, labor market status of re-
spondent’s mother, and parents’ education. We construct three educational categories: 12 years of
education or less, 13-15 years of education, and 16 years of education or more. Thirty-six percent of
8These women are technically employed not at work. Klerman and Leibowitz (1994) use CPS data to show that
the sharp increase in the labor force participation of mothers with very young children (3 months old and younger)
during the 70s and 80s is mostly due to increase in paid and unpaid leave rather than work.
6the women in the sample have 12 years of education or less, 27 percent have between 13 and 15 years
of education, while 37 percent have 16 years of education or more. Seventy percent of our sample
is white, with the remainder evenly split between Hispanic and black. About 1/3 of respondents’
mothers work full time and 1/3 do not work at all. For a large majority of the sample, 75 percent,
none of the parents has college education, for 16 percent one parent has college education, and for
9 percent both parents have college education.
Table 2 presents a summary of several important fertility and labor market outcomes by level
of education. Panel A, which compares the average and the distribution of the number of children,
shows that women with higher levels of education have fewer children. The average number of
children is 1.966 for women with 12 years of education or less, compared with 1.703 for women who
have between 13 and 15 years of education, and 1.731 for women with 16 years of education or
more. The diﬀerence between the averages is generated by larger probability of not having children
for women with higher education. The probability of not having any children is 0.145 for women
with 12 years of education or less, 0.174 for women with 13-15 years of education, and 0.223 for
women with 16 years of education or more. Panel B shows that the timing of marriage, measured as
the average number of years from entry into the sample (that is, from ﬁnishing full-time education)
is very similar across levels of education. Panel C, which compares the average number of years
between marriage and ﬁrst birth, indicates that women with lower levels of education have their
ﬁrst birth sooner after marriage.
Panels D, E, and F present an analysis of the way in which the relationship between fertility and
the level of labor market involvement diﬀers across individuals with diﬀerent levels of education.
Panel D compares the level of labor market involvement before the birth of the ﬁrst child by level
of education, for women who have at least one child between 1979 and 2003, panel E compares
across levels of education the level of labor market involvement after the birth of the ﬁrst child, for
women who have exactly one child between 1979 and 2003, and panel F compares across levels of
education the level of labor market involvement after the birth of the second child, for women who
have exactly two children between 1979 and 2003. Panel D shows that diﬀerences in participation
before the ﬁrst birth are small across levels of education (96.2 for women with 12 years of education
or less, 97.2 for women with 13-15 years of education, and 98.1 percent for women with 16 years
of education or more), but women with higher levels of education are more likely to work full time
(the probability of working full time is 0.704 for women with 12 years of education or less, 0.751 for
women with 13-15 years of education, and 0.805 for women with 16 years of education or more).
The comparison of panels D and E, shows that the decline in participation and in the level of
labor market involvement of those that continue to participate is smaller for women with higher
education. Participation declines by 0.149 for women with 12 years of education or less, by 0.090
for women with 13-15 years of education, and by 0.037 for women with 16 years of education or
more. The probability of working full time declines by 0.155 for women with 12 years of education
or less, by 0.144 for women with 13-15 years of education, and by only 0.056 for women with 16
years of education or more. A comparison of results in panels E and F shows that the eﬀects of the
second child on both participation and the level of labor market involvement of the participants are
larger for women with higher education. Participation increases by 0.016 for women with 12 years
of education or less, and decreases by 0.129 for women with 13-15 years of education and by 0.124
for women with 16 years of education or more.
These results may be generated in part by diﬀerences in observable personal characteristics we
do not control for and by selection bias. The patterns observed in the data — more educated women
have fewer children, have the ﬁrst birth later in life, have higher levels of labor market involvement
7before the birth of the ﬁrst child, and face signiﬁcantly stronger eﬀects of the second child on the
level of labor market involvement — suggest, however, a data-generating mechanism consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical household models of time allocation.
3 Econometric model
Several problems arise in the estimation of the eﬀects of children on women’s labor supply.9 First,
labor market and fertility decisions are endogenous, as the number and timing of children are
variables that are controlled, at least in part, by women.10 Second, the eﬀe c t so fc h i l d r e no nl a b o r
supply are heterogeneous and are correlated with the fertility decisions. Heterogeneous preferences
for market work and children inﬂuence pre-market and early career investments in human capital,
which, in turn, aﬀect the opportunity cost of children. Together, heterogeneous preferences and
correlated, heterogeneous opportunity costs of children jointly determine women’s fertility and labor
market decisions. Third, sequential labor market decisions are correlated and, therefore, maternity-
related work interruptions or reductions in the level of labor market involvement aﬀect labor supply
in subsequent periods. The goal of the econometric model we propose is to capture the variation
in labor market and fertility behavior, as well as in the eﬀects of children on the level of labor
market involvement, across levels of education in a framework that simultaneously addresses the
three key issues in the estimation of the eﬀects of children on labor supply: the endogeneity of labor
market and fertility decisions, the heterogeneity of the eﬀects of children on labor supply and their
correlation with fertility decisions, and correlation of sequential labor market decisions.
Sequential labor market decisions are represented by a multinomial probit model with auto-
correlated error terms while fertility decisions are represented by a probit model with state-dependence
and auto-correlated error terms. Labor market decisions and fertility decisions are driven by a se-
quential optimization process. At the beginning of each period an individual chooses the level of
labor market involvement for the current period and makes a fertility decision. The level of la-
bor market involvement is selected from the set of four alternatives, full-time work (FT), full-time
part-year work (FP), part-time work (PT), and non work (NW), by comparing their associated
value functions denoted by UFT
it , UFP
it ,UPT
it ,a n dUNW
it , where the subscript i indicates individuals,
i =1 ,...,N and subscript t indicates time periods, t =1 ,...,T i. Fertility choices are driven by the
comparison of the value functions corresponding to having and not having a child whose diﬀerences
are denoted by UF
it. Since the choice of a level of labor market involvement depends only on diﬀer-
ences of value functions, we transform the model by considering only values relative to the nonwork
state.
9Browning (1992) and Nakamura and Nakamura (1992) provide reviews of the history of this literature.


































































The transformed latent variables deﬁne the discrete labor market and fertility decisions the
following way:
yFT





it > 0;0 otherwise
yFP





it > 0;0 otherwise
yPT





it > 0;0 otherwise
yNW
it =1 if U1
it ≤ 0 and U2
it ≤ 0 and U3
it ≤ 0;0 otherwise
yF
it =1 if UF
it > 0;0 otherwise
The fertility decision is represented by a binary variable which takes value 1 if a child is conceived
in a given year. We construct the fertility variable from data on children’s birth dates and we
do not consider pregnancies that end in miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion.11 This speciﬁcation
is a departure from previous literature which mostly used the occurrence of a birth to describe
fertility decisions. Our speciﬁcation rests on the premise that time-varying personal characteristics
and variables describing a woman’s relevant socioeconomic environment aﬀect the fertility process
through the conception decision, rather than through the birth of the child.
The vector Kit contains a constant term and three variables describing the number of children
in three age categories (0-1, 2-4, 5 and older), where age is measured at the last birthday. The vari-
ables describing the number of children and their age distribution are included in the participation
equation where they capture the eﬀect of children on the level of labor market involvement. These
variables which describe the entire history of fertility decisions — how many children have been born
and how far in the past — are also included in the fertility equation, thus rendering current fertility
decisions dependent on the entire fertility history.
XLM
it is a vector of personal characteristics relevant to labor market decisions that includes
marital status, spouse’s wage, other income, the region of residence (North East, North Central,
South, and West), and whether the respondent resides in an urban or rural area. XF
it,i sav e c t o r
of personal characteristics relevant to fertility decisions that includes other income, the region of
residence, whether the respondent resides in an urban or rural area, and the number of siblings
with children.
The number of siblings with children provides a description of the fertility behavior of a person’s
siblings. Our use of this variable rests on signiﬁcant evidence from demographic literature that sib-
lings’ fertility behavior aﬀects fertility decisions through social interaction occurring in the context
11NLSY 79 contains information on the number of pregnancies ending in miscarriage, stillbirth, or abortion but
not on the date those pregnancies begin. In addition, the likelihood of termination could be correlated with labor
supply decisions.
9of interpersonal networks.12 The number of siblings with children is excluded from the equations of
labor market decisions.13 In a panel data setting, identiﬁcation comes from changes in the number
of siblings with children. The temporal structure of the decision process we assume in this paper
makes it unlikely that changes in the number of siblings with children are correlated with the error
terms in the participation equations. While respondent’s fertility variable captures the conception
of a child during the current year, the number of siblings with children refers to the situation at the
beginning of the same calendar year (children born to siblings during the past calendar year) and,
therefore, reﬂects past fertility decisions made by the siblings. Even if contemporaneous shocks to
labor supply are correlated across siblings, the number of siblings with children is predetermined.
In Appendix table 1, we analyze the relationship between fertility and the change in the number of
siblings with children. The table presents the estimation results of three OLS regressions that have
the number of children born between 1979 and 2003 as dependent variable and the change in the
number of siblings with children during the same period and a set of controls (number of siblings,
respondent’s education and race, respondent’s parents’ education) as independent variables. The
coeﬃcient for the change in the number of siblings with children is signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
In the speciﬁcation that includes all controls, the coeﬃcient for the change in the number of siblings
with children is 0.1.14
Marital status or spouse’s wage are not included in the fertility equation because, as we focus on
the eﬀects of children on the labor supply of married women, the sample includes only women who
have children while married. We do not include respondent’s age in the speciﬁcation of the labor
market and fertility decisions. Since we account for the dependence of sequential labor market and
fertility decisions by specifying AR(1) structures for the error terms of the four equations, the eﬀect
of age measured as the age of individual i at time t cannot be identiﬁed. It is also unlikely our
results will be aﬀected by signiﬁcant cohort eﬀects since the age range in our sample is only seven
years.
Education aﬀects labor market and fertility decisions through two channels. First, education
enters the model through the expected wages which are a function of the number of years of




12Montgomery and Casterline (1996) provide a theoretical framework in which siblings’ fertility aﬀect fertility
decisions through social interaction. Numerous papers provide empirical evidence that siblings’ behavior inﬂuences a
wide range of indices of fertility behavior. Hogan and Kitagawa (1985) found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of siblings’ behavior
and teenage motherhood. Powers and Hsueh (1997) found that older sister’s out-of-wedlock childbearing aﬀects
younger sister’s age at premarital birth. Rowe et al. (1989), Rodgers and Rowe (1988) and Haurin and Mott (1990)
examined the inﬂuence of older siblings on the adolescent sexual behavior of younger siblings and fond that younger
siblings tend to mimic sexual behavior of their older siblings. Axinn, Clarkberg, and Thornton (1994) ﬁnd that
siblings’ fertility behavior exerts an important inﬂuence on family size preferences even when other factors common
to all family factors are held constant.
13Finding an instrument for identifying the eﬀect of children on labor supply is notoriously challenging. The
instruments used so far in the literature are based on natural experiments - gender composition of the ﬁrst two
children (Carrasco, 2001; Angrist and Evans, 1998) and the birth of twins at the ﬁrst birth (Rosenzweig and Wolpin
1980). These instruments capture exogenous variation in the probability of the second or third birth. If the cost of
having children declines with the number of children this may lead to underestimating the eﬀect of children on labor
supply. In a dynamic setting the challenge of ﬁnding an appropriate instrument is even greater because the variable
has to change with individual and time period.
14By comparison, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), who use twins at the ﬁrst birth as instrument for fertility, ﬁnd
that among women who have the ﬁrst birth between 15 and 24, completed fertility, as measured 20 years later, was
0.15 greater for those women who had twins than for those women without twins; Angrist and Evans (1998) who use
the gender of the ﬁrst two children as instrument for the birth of the third child ﬁnd that among parents with 2 or
more children, the proportion that have the 3 child is 0.06 greater if the ﬁrst two children were of the same sex than
if they were of opposite sex.
10in the participation equations by themselves to capture the way in which they aﬀect the level of
















, to describe the way in which the eﬀect
of children varies with the wage. We use the observed hourly wage for the current labor market state
and impute the hourly wage for the alternative states. The imputation is based on a standard wage
regression that includes second degree polynomials of years of education and experience, a full set
of interactions between the terms of these polynomials and the labor market states, and the urban
and region dummy variables.15 It is important to note that expected wages and the interaction
terms between expected wages and the children variables vary over i, t,a n dl a b o rm a r k e ts t a t e ,
and their coeﬃcients are constrained to be the same across states. Geweke, et al. (1997) point out
that the inclusion of variables whose values diﬀer across alternative choices and whose coeﬃcient
is constrained to be the same across states.is important in the identiﬁcation of multinomial probit
models such as this, which would otherwise be diﬃcult due to ﬂat spots in the likelihood function.
Second, controlling for wages, education aﬀects labor supply, demand for children, and the
eﬀects of children on labor supply through diﬀerences in preferences and in the productivity of time
spent in the home production of utility-generating commodities. We capture these diﬀerences using
a set of education-speciﬁcr a n d o mc o e ﬃcients.
The mixed-eﬀect structure, which combines ﬁxed and random coeﬃcients, allows us to study
how the relationship between fertility and labor market behavior varies across education levels and
other time-invariant personal characteristics like race, and family background characteristics, and,
controlling for these variables, to assess the role of individual-level heterogeneity. α0s,β
0s,γ and
δ
0s are vectors of global (ﬁxed eﬀect) parameters which are common across individuals in the sam-
ple. We use ﬁve, m =1 ,...,5, independent sources of heterogeneity aﬀecting individuals’ decisions:
individuals’ time invariant personal characteristics (education and race), family background vari-
ables related to tastes for work and family (the labor market status of respondent’s mother and
the education levels of respondent’s parents), and individual-level heterogeneity. Each source of
heterogeneity has lm levels. The number of levels is three for education (12 years or less, 13-15
years, 16 years or more), three for race (white, black, and Hispanic), two for respondent’s mother’s
labor market status (full time and other), three for parents’ education (none of the parents, one,
or both parents have college education), and is equal to the number of individuals in the sample
for individual-level heterogeneity. Each individual in the data is assigned a level for each source of
heterogeneity l(i,m) (individual i’s level of education, race, mother’s labor market status, parents’
education, her individual-speciﬁc level of heterogeneity). To level l of heterogeneity source m cor-





















ml, correspond to the four equations of the model. Each component includes
15We acknowledge that including expected wages in the speciﬁcation of the value functions raises the question
of their endogeneity. The main potential source of endogeneity is the possibility that parameters of the wage oﬀer
distributions are correlated with time-invariant individual-speciﬁc components of the error terms in the participation
equations. We account for this possibility by incorporating individual heterogeneity in the participation equations.
Even after accounting for individual heterogeneity, there is still the possibility that shocks to the wage oﬀer distri-
bution may be correlated with shocks to the unobserved determinants of the level of labor market involvement. In
ad i ﬀerent setting (two-state model of labor force participation, which does not account for endogeneity of fertility
and for individual heterogeneity) Geweke and Keane (2000) have showed how wages can be modeled endogenously.
The extension of their model to our setting faces daunting challenges both technical (sharp increase in the number
of dependent variables of the model) and substantive (the lack of appropriate instruments). Therefore, we do not
pursue this avenue of research in this paper, choosing instead to focus on the endogeneity of fertility and the accurate
deﬁnition of the level of labor market involvement.
11four elements, one random eﬀect and three random coeﬃcients, corresponding to the four variables
in the vector Kit.W e a s s u m e θml are normally distributed, independent across the lm levels of
heterogeneity of source m, θml ∼ MVN(0,D m), independent across sources of heterogeneity, and
uncorrelated with the regressors XLM
it ,XF
it,Z it and the error terms uit.
The random coeﬃcients corresponding to education, race, and family background variables
capture the eﬀects of these time-invariant personal characteristics on labor market and fertility de-
cisions, while the individual-speciﬁc random coeﬃcients describe the individual-level heterogeneity
in labor market and fertility behavior. The random coeﬃcients corresponding to the constant terms
in the four equations capture the variation in propensities for market work and children. The ran-
dom coeﬃcients corresponding to the children variables in the participation equations describe the
heterogeneity of the eﬀects of children on the level of labor market involvement. The random coef-
ﬁcients corresponding to the children variables in the fertility equation capture individual variation
in the timing and spacing of births (for example, a relatively small individual-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcient for
the variables describing the presence of young children and a relatively large individual-speciﬁcc o -
eﬃcient for the variable describing the presence of older children indicates the occurrence of births
at larger intervals). Finally, the general correlation structure of the random coeﬃcients — for each
source of heterogeneity, random coeﬃcients are assumed to be correlated both within and between
equations — captures the correlation between preferences for market work and children, the eﬀects
of children on labor supply, and fertility behavior (timing and spacing of births).
















¤0is distributed IIDN(0,Ψ),Ψ = I4, and it is uncorrelated with the random coeﬃ-














Work experience, while not explicitly included in the speciﬁcation of labor market decisions,
enters our model in two ways. First, since we explicitly model dependence of sequential labor
market decisions, the level of labor market involvement in the previous periods directly aﬀects
current decisions. Second, current labor market decisions depend on potential wages in each labor
market state, which, in turn, depend on labor market experience — the realization of past labor
market decisions.
In addition to exclusion restrictions mentioned earlier, two other sources contribute to identi-
ﬁcation in this model. First, we assume that the vectors of random coeﬃcients corresponding to
each source of heterogeneity have a joint normal distribution. Second, children variables entering
the participation equations are non-linear transformations of the lagged dependent variables in the
fertility equation. Non-linearity is generated by the construction of the children variables (number
of children in certain age categories) as well as by the use of conception as the fertility variable (the
decision to conceive a child in a given year could result in the birth of a child in the same calendar
year or in the following calendar year, as well as in the birth of twins).
The dynamic nature of both participation and fertility decisions requires assumptions regarding
initial conditions. Given our speciﬁcation, we need to know the distributions of children variables
12in the initial period and the distribution of the error terms. The selection of the sample ensures
that initial conditions are identical across individuals — we choose the ﬁrst year out of school as
the ﬁrst period in the sample and we include only women who marry and have children only after
entering our sample.
To estimate the model, we employ Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques (MCMC). MCMC
methods avoid one of the major diﬃculties inherent in the alternative maximum likelihood or
simulated maximum likelihood estimation methods — the evaluation at each step of the maximization
process of multiple integrals, whose dimensions increase very quickly with the number of equations
to be estimated. The estimation algorithm we propose in this paper builds on several sources in
the literature: Geweke et al. (1997) who propose a Gibbs sampler algorithm for estimating a panel
multinomial probit model where errors follow an AR(1) process, McCulloch and Rossi (1994) who
estimate a multi-period multinomial probit model with random eﬀects, and Gilks et al. (1993)
who propose an algorithm for the estimation of a single-equation, panel-data model with random
coeﬃcients. For the parameters of interest we choose proper but noninformative prior distributions.
The estimation algorithm and the exact form of our assumptions concerning the prior distributions
are presented in Appendix 1.
4 Estimation Results
Although coeﬃcient estimates are diﬃcult to interpret because of the non-linearity of the model,
the estimation results presented in tables 3, 4, and 5 provide essential insight into the eﬀect of
children on women’s labor supply. Table 3 shows the posterior means and the posterior standard
deviations (PSTD) for the global parameters of the model. The coeﬃcients of the three children
variables are negative in all participation equations; their absolute values are largest for full-time
work (column 1) and weakest for part-time work (column 5). The coeﬃcient for children with
ages between 0 and 1 year is -1.429 in the equation of full time relative to nonwork, -0.975 in
the equation of full time part year relative to nonwork, and -0.128 in the equation of part time
relative to nonwork. This suggests that children lower women’s level of labor market involvement
by reducing the attractiveness of work relative to nonwork and the attractiveness of full time and
full time part year work relative to part time. The coeﬃcients for older children are smaller in
absolute value, indicating that the eﬀect declines with the age of the child. For example, in the
equation of full time relative to nonwork the coeﬃcients are -1.429 for a child age 0-1, -1.058 for a
child age 2-4, and -0.530 for a child with age 5 years or more.
The coeﬃcients for marital status are negative, large in absolute value, and signiﬁcant in all
equations, which indicates that marriage has a strong negative eﬀect on the level of labor market
involvement. Higher spouse’s wage and non-labor income are associated as well with lower levels
of labor market involvement. Women leaving in urban areas are more likely to hold full-time jobs.
The coeﬃcient for wage, 0.702, indicates that, for women without children, higher wage oﬀers
associated with a certain labor market state increase the likelihood of occupying that state. The
coeﬃcients for the interaction terms between wage oﬀers and the children variables, -0.015 for the
interaction between wage and the number of children with ages between 0 and 1, -0.046 for the
interaction between wage and the number of children with ages between 2 and 4, and -0.097 for
the interaction between wage and the number of children with ages age 5 years or more, suggest
that although higher wages will increase the probability of returning to work after birth, their eﬀect
declines with the age of the child.
13The estimates of the AR(1) coeﬃcients, ρ, are 0.701 for the equation of full time relative to
nonwork, 0.017 for full time part year relative to nonwork, and 0.724 for part time relative to
nonwork. Given the deﬁnitions of the four labor market states in which full time part year describes
relatively short work interruptions, whereas full time, part time, and nonwork describe longer spells
with constant level of labor market involvement, the small coeﬃcient for full time part year,0.017,
suggests that short birth-related interruptions will have a small eﬀect on subsequent labor supply.
On the other hand, the large coeﬃcients in both full time and part time equations suggest that full
time, part time, and nonwork are persistent states and, therefore, longer periods of nonparticipation
or reduced labor market involvement will have strong negative eﬀects on future labor supply.
The random coeﬃcients capture the variation in the labor market and fertility behavior across
levels of education, races, family background characteristics, and, controlling for these characteris-
tics, across individuals. Table 4 shows the posterior means of the random coeﬃcients corresponding
to the personal and family background characteristics. Education is the strongest determinant of
women’s labor supply and of the eﬀects of children on labor supply. Its eﬀect is largest in the
full-time equation. The coeﬃcients corresponding to the constant term (column 1) are -0.330 for
women with less than 12 years of education, 0.142 for women with 13-15 years of education, and
0.188 for women with 16 or more years of education, suggesting that women with higher education
are relatively more likely to work full time. The coeﬃcients corresponding to the children variables
(columns 2-4) show that the negative eﬀects of children on the probability of working full time
are stronger for women with higher education. The coeﬃcients corresponding to the number of
children with ages between 0 and 1 (column 2) are 0.229 for women with 12 years of education or
less, -0.042 for women with 13-15 years of education, and -0.187 for women with 16 or more years
of education.16 These values imply that the presence of a child with age between 0 and 1 reduces
the propensity to work full time (the latent variable corresponding the full time work) by 1.200
for women with 12 years of education or less, compared with 1.471 for women with 13-15 years
of education and with 1.615 for women with 16 years of education or more. Similarly, the eﬀects
of older children on the propensity to work full time are stronger for more educated women. The
coeﬃcients corresponding to the constant term in the fertility equations, 0.046 for women with 12
years of education or less, -0.014 for women with 13-15 years of education, and -0.032 for women
with 16 or more years of education, indicate that propensity to have children declines with the level
of education.
White women are more likely to work full time compared to black and Hispanic women: the
coeﬃcients corresponding to the constant term are 0.125 for white women, 0.009 for black women,
and -0.115 for Hispanic women. The negative eﬀects of children on the probability of working
full time are stronger for white women relative to black and Hispanic women. The coeﬃcients
corresponding to the constant term in the fertility equations indicate that Hispanic women have
a higher propensity to have children than both white and black women. The eﬀects of family
background variables are also concentrated in the full time equation: respondents whose mothers
worked full time are more likely to work full time, while those whose parents were both college
16The interpretation of these coeﬃcients is analogous to that of the coeﬃcients of a complete interaction between
the children variables and each of the four variables in a classical regression setting. For example, to compute the
eﬀect of having one child with age between 2 and 4 on the propensity of working full time by education level, we add
the coeﬃcient for children with ages between 2 and 4 in the full time equation from table 2 with the coeﬃcients for
children with ages 2 to 4 in the full time equation from table 3. Thus, having one child between ages 2 and 4 reduces
the propensity of working full time by -0.977+0.238=-0.739 for someone with less than 12 years of education, by
-0.977-0.085 = -1.062 for someone with 13-15 years of education, and by -0.977-0.153 = -1.130, for someone with 16
or more years of education.
14educated are less likely to work full time.
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix of the individual-speciﬁc random coeﬃcients. The corre-
lations between the random coeﬃcients corresponding to the constant terms in the participation
equations and the random coeﬃcient corresponding to the constant term in the fertility equation
vary from very low, 0.051, for full time and fertility, to 0.422 for full time part year and fertil-
ity, to 0.240 for part time and fertility. This indicates that, controlling for personal and family
background characteristics, women with stronger propensities for lower levels of labor market in-
volvement have stronger propensity to have children. The random coeﬃcients corresponding to the
children variables in the full time and full time part year equations are positively correlated with
t h er a n d o mc o e ﬃcients corresponding to the constant term in the fertility equation. The positive
correlations indicate that strong negative eﬀects of children on the level of labor market involvement
are associated with lower propensities to have children.
These results underscore the importance of modelling fertility decisions endogenously and the
strength of the mixed-eﬀects framework in dealing with this problem. We showed that the eﬀects of
children on labor supply are correlated with the propensity to have children both across education
levels and, controlling for individual characteristics, across individuals. These correlations imply
that women who face higher implicit costs of children will have fewer children. As a result, without
accounting for the endogeneity of fertility decisions, estimates of the eﬀects of children would be
upward biased (smaller in absolute value). In addition, if the eﬀect of children is larger for women
with higher education, estimated educational diﬀerences will be downward biased.
5 Simulation Results
5.1 Simulation Design
We use simulations based on the estimation results to measure the eﬀe c t so fc h i l d r e no nt h ep r o b a -
bility distribution of the four labor market states. We measure the variation of these eﬀects across
levels of education, and we assess the extent to which these diﬀerences are generated by diﬀerences
in wage oﬀers or by factors like preferences and productivity in household work, which are captured
by the random coeﬃcients.
While we recognize that both the number of births and their timing may aﬀect women’s labor
market behavior, the large number of possible labor market and fertility histories forces us to focus
exclusively on the number of births. We conﬁne our analysis to three fertility histories: no birth,
one birth, and two births. Table 6 describes the timing of the relevant events. In all three fertility
histories marriage takes place in the second year. The conception of the ﬁrst child takes place
during the second period, and the ﬁrst birth takes place at the beginning of the third period. The
conception of the second child takes place during the eighth period, and the second birth takes
place at the beginning of the ninth period. The timing of marriage and the timing of the ﬁrst
birth that we use in the simulation scenario are those with the highest frequency in our data: 15.3
percent of all marriages take place one year after entry into the labor market, 23 percent of the
ﬁrst conceptions take place in the year of marriage. The largest share of the second conceptions (32
percent) take place two years after the ﬁrst conception, but we chose this particular timing for the
second birth to avoid spurious results generated by the discrete changes in the ages of children. A
child born at the beginning of year 3 moves into age category 2-4 in period 5 and into age category
5 years and older in period 8. The discrete changes in the age of the ﬁrst child, specially the move
in age category 5 years and older, generate large changes in the level of labor market involvement
15and, because of the non-linearity of the multivariate normal cumulative distribution function, will
have an impact on the eﬀects of subsequent children.
We construct three basic individual proﬁles: white woman with 12 years of education, white
woman with 14 years of education, and white woman with 16 years of education. For all three
proﬁles, personal characterisitcs are set at the values with the highest frequencies in our sample.
We assume that none of the respondent’s parents has college education and that the respondent’s
mother did not work full time. We set other family income at zero, the region of residence to North-
East, and the type of residence to urban. We set spouse’s wage at 15530, the median level. For each
individual proﬁl e ,w es e tt h er a n d o mc o e ﬃcients corresponding to the individual heterogeneity to
zero, the average value. For every period along each possible labor market history, we compute the
wages corresponding to the three working labor market states — full time, full time part year, and
part time — using the coeﬃcient estimates from the wage equation, the characteristics associated
with the relevant individual proﬁle (number of years of education, urban location, region), and the
labor market experience accumulated until that point in time.
For each of the three individual proﬁles we compute the joint probability distribution of all
possible labor market and fertility histories. The probability of a complete history is the cumulative
distribution function of a multivariate normal distribution; to calculate the multivariate normal
CDFs, we use the GHK smooth recursive simulator of Geweke (1989), Hajivassiliou (1990), and
Keane (1994). Let S denote the set of four possible labor market states in a period, full time
(ft), full time part year (fp), part time (pt) and non work (nw), st denote the labor market
state in period t,t =1 ,...,15,a n dhj denote the fertility history, where j =0 ,1,2,represents the
number of births taking place in the respective fertility history. Further, let f(s1,s 2,...,s 15,h j)
denote the joint probability distribution of all possible labor market histories and fertility histories.
This probability distribution is conditional on a vector of observed characteristics and a level of
individual-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity, but we omit this conditioning to simplify notation.
Given these joint probabilities, for each observation, we compute the probability of having no
children f(h0), one child in year three f(h1) and two children in years three and nine f(h2),a l o n g
with the probability of all possible labor market histories conditional on the speciﬁc fertility history
f(s1,s 2,...,s 15|hj), which to simplify notation we denote by fj(s1,s 2,...,s 15). Finally, we compute
the probability distribution of the labor market states in every time period conditional on a given
fertility history, which is denoted by fj(st).
We measure the eﬀects of the two children on the level of labor market involvement by comparing
the probability distributions of the labor market states fj(st), for all time periods, across the three
fertility histories. The eﬀect of the ﬁrst birth, which takes place at the beginning of year 3, is
computed by comparing the probability distributions for the fertility histories with zero and one
birth, in the years following the birth:
TE1
t = f1(st) − f0(st),t≥ 3
The eﬀect of the second birth, which takes place at the beginning of year 9, is computed by
comparing the probability distributions for the fertility histories with one and two births, in the
years following the second birth:
TE2
t = f2(st) − f1(st),t≥ 9
We assess the way education inﬂuences the eﬀect of children on women’s labor supply by comparing
the total eﬀects of the two children for women with 14 and 16 years of education with the total
eﬀect for the baseline case, women with 12 years of education.
16To assess the extent to which the diﬀerences across levels of education are generated by dif-
ferences in the random coeﬃcients or by diﬀerences in the mean of wage oﬀers, we construct two
counterfactual proﬁles. For the ﬁrst counterfactual proﬁle, we set the level of education relevant for
the computation of the mean wage at 12 years and the level of education relevant for the determi-
nation of the random coeﬃcients at 14 years. For the second counterfactual proﬁle, we set the level
of education relevant for the computation of the mean wage at 12 years and the level of education
relevant for the determination of the random coeﬃcients at 16 years.
Levels of education relevant for the determination of random coeﬃcients and wages
Basic proﬁle 1 Cnterfct. proﬁle 1 Basic proﬁle 2 Cnterfct. proﬁle 2 Basic proﬁle 3
Rnd. Coeﬀ. 12 years 14 years 14 years 16 years 16 years
Wage 12 years 12 years 14 years 12 years 16 years
For each level of education (14 or 16 years), the component corresponding to the random co-
eﬃcients is constructed by comparing the corresponding counterfactual proﬁles with the baseline
proﬁle, women with 12 years of education. The component corresponding to the diﬀerences in
the mean wage oﬀer is computed by comparing the basic proﬁles 2 and 3 with their respective
counterfactual proﬁles.17
5.2 Level of Labor Market Involvement before the First Birth
Table 7a shows the levels of labor market involvement before the ﬁrst birth, by level of education.
Women with higher education work more before the birth of the ﬁrst child. The diﬀerence is not as
much in the participation rates as in the level of labor market involvement of those who participate.
Participation rates are 0.914 for women with 12 years of education, 0.966 for women with 14 years
of education, and 0.978 for women with 16 years of education. The probability of working full
time is 0.565 for women with 12 years of education (61.8 percent of those who participate), 0.708
for women with 14 years of education (73.3 percent of participants), and 0.744 for women with 16
years of education (76.1 of participants). The probabilities of working full time part year and part
time are higher for women with lower levels of education: the probability of working full time part
year is 0.205 for women with 12 years of education compared with 0.165 for women with 14 years
of education and 0.156 for women with 16 years of education; the probability of working part time
is 0.144 for women with 12 years of education compared with 0.093 for women with 14 years of
education and 0.078 for women with 16 years of education.
The diﬀerences across education levels are in great part captured by the random coeﬃcients.
Table 7b shows the decomposition of the diﬀerences between the pre-birth levels of labor market
involvement of women with diﬀerent levels of education. Columns 1 and 2 show the decomposition
of the diﬀerence between women with 12 years of education and those with 14 years of education,
and columns 3 and 4 show the decomposition of the diﬀerence between women with 12 years
of education and those with 16 years of education. Other things equal, higher wages increase
participation and the probability of working full time, but their eﬀect is much smaller than that
17Since model is non-linear, the order of the decomposition could be important. To check the robustness of
our results, we performed the alternative decomposition in which the counterfactual proﬁles were constructed by
changing the level of education relevant to the determination of wages and keeping the level of education relevant
to the determination of the random coeﬃcients the same as in the baseline proﬁle. The results for this alternative
decomposition are very similar.
17captured by the random coeﬃcients. For example, the participation probability of women with 16
years of education is 6.4 percentage points larger than that of women with 12 years of education; the
component corresponding to the random coeﬃcients is 3.7 percentage points, while the component
corresponding to wages is 2.8 percentage points. The probability of working full time of women
with 16 years of education is 17.9 percentage points larger than that of women with 12 years of
education; the component corresponding to the random coeﬃcients is 15.5 percentage points, while
the component corresponding to wages is 2.4 percentage points.
To interpret these results, we use Gronau’s (1977) time-allocation model as reference. In this
model, before the birth of the ﬁrst child, women derive utility from the consumption of commodities
unrelated to children, which are produced with a combination of goods and services purchased on the
market and time. Women allocate their time between leisure, market work, and home production.
Higher wages aﬀect the time allocated to market work through three channels. First higher wages
induce women to shift time from home production to market work (they substitute market goods
and services for own time in the production of utility generating commodities) until the marginal
productivity at home is equal to the wage. Second, higher wages induce women to substitute goods-
intensive commodities for time-intensive commodities, thus reducing leisure and increasing the time
allocated to market work (the substitution eﬀect). Third, higher wages induce women to consume
more of each commodity, thus increasing leisure at the expense of market work (the income eﬀect).
Our results indicate that other things equal, the higher wages of more educated women increase
the level of labor market involvement. This is possible under two circumstances. First, if the
substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect, then time allocated to market work increases at
the expense of both home production time and leisure. Second, if the income eﬀect dominates
the substitution eﬀect, but the transfer of time from home production to market work exceeds the
transfer of time from market work to leisure, the time allocated to market work and leisure will
grow at the expense of home production time. Much of the diﬀerence in the level of labor market
involvement is captured, however, by the random coeﬃcients. This implies that more educated
women have either stronger preferences for utility-generating commodities that are goods-intensive,
lower productivity in the home production of utility-generating commodities — which, holding the
wage constant, induces them to spend less time in home production — or lower productivity of time
relative to other inputs into the production of utility-generating commodities.
5.3 The Eﬀect of Children on the Level of Labor Market Involvement.
The total eﬀect of the ﬁrst child and the results of the decomposition are presented in ﬁgures 1, 2,
and 3. Figure 1 compares the total eﬀect of the ﬁrst child on the level of labor market involvement
across levels of education. Figure 2 shows the decomposition of the diﬀerence between the eﬀect
of the ﬁrst child for women with 14 years of education and the eﬀect of the ﬁrst child for women
with 12 years of education. Figure 3 shows the decomposition of the diﬀerence between the eﬀect
of the ﬁrst child for women with 16 years of education and the eﬀect of the ﬁrst child for women
with 12 years of education. Each ﬁgure contains four panels depicting the eﬀect of the child and
the results of the decomposition separately for participation and for the probabilities of the three
working labor market states, full time, full time part year, and part time.
Figure 1 shows that the birth of the ﬁrst child reduces participation and the probabilities of
working full time and full time part year, and increases the probability of working part time, for
all levels of education. The eﬀect of the child is largest immediately after birth and declines with
18the age of the child.18 The participation proﬁle for women with 12 years of education is the lowest,
while the proﬁle for women with 16 years of education is the highest, which indicates that the eﬀect
of the ﬁrst child on participation decreases with education. The opposite is true for the probability
of working full time. The proﬁle for women with 12 years of education is the highest, while the
proﬁle for women with 16 years of education is the lowest, indicating that the eﬀect of the ﬁrst
child on the probability of working full time increases with education. The birth of the ﬁrst child
reduces the probability of working full time part year and increases the probability of working part
time. For both full time part year and part time, the eﬀects of the ﬁrst child are stronger for more
educated women. The discrepancy between the eﬀect of education on participation and the eﬀect
on the probability of working part time is explained by the fact that, following the birth of the ﬁrst
child, more educated women are more likely to start working part time rather than to stop working.
Figures 2 and 3 show the results of the decomposition. In both ﬁgures, for both participation
and full time, the component corresponding to the wage diﬀerences is positive, which means that the
higher wage oﬀers of the more educated women reduce the eﬀects of children on participation and
on the probability of working full time. The components corresponding to the random coeﬃcients,
which capture diﬀerences in preferences and productivity in home production, are negative for both
participation and full time. For full time part year and part time, the components corresponding
to both wages and the random coeﬃcients are positive.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the total education eﬀects and the results of the decomposition for the
second child. The most notable diﬀerence between the results for the ﬁrst child and those for the
second child is the fact that the negative eﬀect of the second child on participation is stronger for
more educated women. Otherwise, the results for the second child are similar to a large extent to
those for the ﬁrst child. Following the birth of the second child, participation and the probabilities
of working full time and full time part year decline, while the probability of working part time
increases; the eﬀects decline with the age of the child. The negative eﬀect of the second child on the
probability of working full time and the positive eﬀect on the probability of working part time are
stronger for more educated women. The reduction in the probability of working full time part year
is stronger for women with lower education. For both participation and full time, the component
corresponding to the wage diﬀerences is positive, suggesting that higher wages reduce the eﬀect
of the second child on participation and full time; the component corresponding to the random
coeﬃcients is negative. For full time part year and part time, the both components are positive.
For an interpretation of these results, we return to the theoretical framework provided by
Gronau’s (1977) model. When the ﬁrst child is born, women who have been working start reallo-
cating leisure and market time to the production of child-related, utility-generating commodities
(number and quality). The transfer continues until the marginal product of time spent in the home
production of child care is equal to the wage. If the market time is exhausted before the equality is
reached, women will start transferring time spent in the home production of commodities unrelated
to children to child care. This transfer will continue until the marginal product of time spent in
home production of child care is equal to the marginal product of time spent in the home production
of the utility-generating commodities unrelated to children. Women who have not been working
in the market will reallocate leisure and time spent in home production of the utility-generating
commodities unrelated to children to child care activities. Other things equal (productivity of home
18The discrete changes in the direct eﬀect of children are generated by the deﬁnition of the variables that describe
the age of the children. In reality, the age of the child and the direct eﬀect change continuously. An interpolation
of our results would probably capture more accurately the dynamics of the direct and indirect eﬀects and would
mitigate the patterns that occur at discontinuity points.
19production of child care, preferences) higher wages imply that, following the birth of the child, the
transfer of time from market work to home production of child care will be smaller. Since the
transfer takes place until marginal product in home production of child care equals wage, decreas-
ing marginal product and higher wage mean that less time will have to be transferred to equate the
two. Hence, other things equal, higher wages should be associated with smaller eﬀects of children
on labor supply. Our ﬁnding that higher wages reduce the eﬀect of children is consistent with this
prediction.
There is no theoretical guidance as to how preferences and productivity at home are related to
education. In this theoretical framework, controlling for wage, higher marginal product schedule
for the home production of child quality means that more time has to be transferred to child care
before the marginal product is equal to the wage. Hence, controlling for wages, women with higher
productivity in home production of child quality will spend more time per child in home production
of child quality. Also important is the relationship between the marginal product of own time and
the marginal product of market inputs into the production of child quality. It is possible that,
as more time is allocated to child care, its marginal product becomes smaller than the marginal
product of market inputs. Beyond this point, increases in child quality can be achieved only by
increasing the quantity of market inputs, which implies an increase in the time allocated to market
work. As a result, if productivity of time in the home production of child quality is high relative to
the productivity of market inputs, then, other things equal, the eﬀect of the child on labor supply
will be larger.19 Finally, stronger preferences for child quality imply higher demand for child quality
and, other things equal, stronger eﬀect of children on labor supply. Our results — the negative sign
of the component captured by the random coeﬃcients — suggest that women with higher education
are characterized by a combination of stronger preferences for time-intensive child quality, higher
marginal product of time spent in the production of child quality, and higher marginal product of
time relative to the marginal product of other inputs into the production of child quality.
5.4 Preferences vs. Productivity of Time Spent in Home Production of
Child Quality
From a policy perspective, it is important to further examine the component captured by the
random coeﬃcients and disentangle the role of preferences from the role of the marginal product
of time spent in the home production of child care. If diﬀerences across levels of education were
mainly generated by diﬀerences in preferences, there would be little public policy can accomplish
in terms of reducing the implicit cost of children. If, on the other hand, the productivity of time
in home production of child quality played the dominant role, availability of high quality child care
and child care subsidies for working mothers could eﬃciently reduce the implicit cost of children.
The mixed-eﬀects framework allows us to further reﬁne our analysis in this direction. The
binding constraint is the lack of variables that accurately describe either preferences for child quality
or productivity of own time in the home production of child quality. It is possible, however, to shed
some light on the relative importance of these two factors, using information from NLSY79. Eight
questions included in the 1979 and the 1982 surveys elicit information on individuals’ attitudes
towards the role of women in the household.20 We use the answers to the questions from the 1982
19For example, if market supplied child care is of low quality, women will prefer producing child quality using own
time as input, regardless of how high their wages are.
20Surveyed individuals were asked their opinions on the following eighth statements: a) a woman’s place is in the
home not in the oﬃce of shop; b) a wife who carries out her full family responsibilities doesn’t have time for outside
20survey to construct an index of women’s attitudes.21 The index has three categories and ranks
women from those who strongly disagreed with the statements implying that the place of a woman
is in the household (the ﬁrst category) to those that strongly agreed with these statements (the
third category). Although we recognize that our index is an imperfect description of an individual’s
preferences over child quality and utility-generating commodities unrelated to children, we think
it is correlated with these preferences. Women in the ﬁrst category are likely to have relatively
stronger preferences for utility-generating commodities unrelated to children, whereas women in
the third category are likely to have relatively stronger preferences for child quality.
We re-estimated the model including this index among the observed sources of heterogeneity,
together with education, race, and family background variables. We compute the eﬀect of children
on the level labor market involvement, we examine separately the role of preferences, and we
decompose the educational diﬀerences in the component corresponding to wages and the component
corresponding to the random coeﬃcients, now controlling for preferences.22
Before turning to the main results, it is important to note that attitudes are correlated with
education: women with higher education are more likely to disagree with the statements implying
that the place of a woman is in the household. Among women with 16 years of education or more,
44 percent are in the ﬁrst category of our index — strongly disagree — and 20 percent are in the third
category — strongly agree; among women with 12 years of education or less, only 21 percent are in
the ﬁrst category, but 49 percent are in the third category. Insofar our index describes preferences,
this implies women with higher education have relatively stronger preferences for utility-generating
commodities unrelated to children.
In table 8 we compare the level of labor market involvement before the birth of the ﬁrst child for
women in categories 1 and 3 of the index. Women in category 1 — those with stronger preferences
for utility generating commodities unrelated to children — have higher participation rates. Among
those who participate, they have higher levels of labor market involvement: the share of participants
working full time is larger for women in category 1 while the shares of participants working full
time part year and part time are, larger among women in category 3.
In ﬁgure 7 we compare the eﬀect of the ﬁrst child on the level of labor market involvement
for women in categories 1 and 3. The negative eﬀects of the ﬁrst child on participation, on the
probability of working full time, and on the probability of working full time part year are smaller for
women in category 1. The positive eﬀect of the ﬁrst child on the probability of working part time is
larger for women in category 3. These results imply that children have smaller eﬀects on the level
of labor market involvement of women with stronger preferences for utility-generating commodities
unrelated to children.
Finally in ﬁgure 8 we compare the component corresponding to the random coeﬃcients from
employment; c) a working wife feels more useful than one who doesn’t hold a job; d) employment of wives leads to
juvenile delinquency; e) employment of both parents is necessary to keep up with the high cost of living; f) it is much
better for everyone concerned if the man is the achiever outside the home and the women takes care of the home and
family; g) men should share work around the house with women, such as doing dishes, cleaning, etc; h) women are
much happier if they stay at home and take care of their children.
21We apply principal component analysis. The ﬁrst principal component captures a large share of the variation in
attitudes across individuals. It ranks women from those who strongly disagree with the statements implying that a
woman’s place is in the household to those that strongly agree with them. We use the ﬁrst principal component to
construct a discrete index (with three categories) of women’s attitudes.
22For the sake of brevity, we present only the results pertaining to white women with 12 years of education and to
the eﬀect of the ﬁrst child. The results for the second child and those for women with 14 and 16 years of education
are very similar.
21the main speciﬁcation with that constructed using results from the speciﬁcation that includes the
indicator for preferences. The components corresponding to the random coeﬃcients are larger in
absolute value when we control for preferences, but diﬀerences across speciﬁcations are small. This
result is not surprising. Women with higher education are more likely to have stronger preferences
for utility-generating commodities unrelated to children. Since women with stronger preferences
for utility-generating commodities unrelated to children face smaller eﬀects of children, controlling
for preferences increases the educational diﬀerences in the eﬀect of children on labor supply..
Reiterating the caveat that the index of women’s attitudes is an imperfect description of pref-
erences, our results have three main implications. First, women with stronger preferences for
utility-generating commodities unrelated to children work more before the birth of the ﬁrst child
and children have smaller eﬀects on their level of labor market involvement. Second, women with
higher education have relatively stronger preferences for utility-generating commodities unrelated
to children. Third, controlling for preferences has a small eﬀect on the magnitude of the component
captured by the random coeﬃcients, which means productivity of time spent in the home produc-
tion of child quality is the main determinant of the stronger eﬀect of children on the labor supply
of more educated women. Women with higher education are more productive than women with
lower education in the home production of child quality and have higher productivity of their own
time relative to market inputs in the production of child quality.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We analyze the way in which the eﬀect of children on the level of labor market involvement of
married women varies with education. The econometric framework we propose explicitly accounts
for the endogeneity of labor market and fertility decisions, for the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of
children on labor supply, for the correlation between the eﬀect of children and subsequent fertility
decisions, and for the correlation of sequential labor market decisions. We use a model with four
labor market states which provides an accurate description of the level of labor market involvement.
We estimate our model using a 25-year panel, which follows women from their entry into the labor
force and captures almost complete fertility histories. We model the eﬀect of women’s education
on their labor market and fertility decisions through two channels: ﬁrst, we include expected wages
and interaction terms between expected wages and the variables describing the number and age
distribution of children in the participation equations; second, education-speciﬁcr a n d o mc o e ﬃcients
capture the variation of the labor supply, of the demand for children, and of the eﬀects of children
on labor supply across levels of education.
We ﬁnd that women with higher education have fewer children. Before the birth of the ﬁrst
child, women with higher education have higher rates of participation and among participants they
have higher levels of labor market involvement. Diﬀerences in participation and in the level of
labor market involvement of participants are generated by both wage diﬀerences and diﬀerences
in preferences and productivity in home production, which are captured by the education-speciﬁc
random coeﬃcients. The birth of the ﬁrst child reduces participation and the level of labor market
involvement of those who continue to participate. The reduction in participation is larger for women
with lower levels of education, but the reduction in the probability of working full time is larger for
women with higher education. Women with higher education are relatively more likely to respond
to the birth of the ﬁrst child by lowering their level of labor market involvement rather than by
dropping out of the market. The eﬀect of the second child on both participation and the probability
of working full time is larger for women with higher education.
22We decompose the diﬀerences across levels of education in two components: a component gener-
ated by diﬀerences in wage oﬀers across levels of education and a component generated by diﬀerences
in preferences and diﬀerences in the productivity of time spent in home production of child care.
We capture the ﬁrst component by including wage oﬀers and interaction terms between wage oﬀers
and the variables describing the number and the age distribution of children in the speciﬁcation
of the participation equations. The second component is captured by a set of education-speciﬁc
random coeﬃcients. For both participation and full time, the wage component is positive, which in-
dicates that, other things equal, higher wage oﬀers reduce the eﬀect of children on the level of labor
market involvement. For both participation and full time, the component captured by the random
coeﬃcients is negative and larger in absolute value than the wage component, which indicates that
diﬀerences in preferences and productivity of time spent in home production of child quality are
responsible for the larger eﬀect of children on the labor supply of more educated women.
We further examine the component captured by the random coeﬃcients. We use an index
of women’s attitudes as proxy for preferences to disentangle the role of preferences from that of
productivity of time spent in home production of child quality. We ﬁnd that productivity of time
spent in the home production of child quality is the main determinant of the stronger eﬀect of
children on the labor supply of more educated women. Women with higher education are more
productive than women with lower education in the home production of child quality and have
higher productivity of their own time relative to market inputs in the production of child quality.
Our main ﬁnding that women’s labor supply responsiveness to children increases with educa-
tion is consistent with the results of Gronau (1973), Hill and Staﬀord (1980), Leibowitz (1974),
Mincer and Polacheck (1974, 1978). Our results suggest that one of the primary eﬀects of children
on women’s labor supply is through the number of hours worked and that women with higher
education are relatively more likely to respond to the birth of a child by reducing the number of
hours. This implies that studies that focus the eﬀects of children on labor market participation will
underestimate the eﬀect of children on women’s labor supply, as well as the diﬀerences in the eﬀect
of children across levels of education.
The policy signiﬁcance of our results is twofold. First, since higher wage oﬀers reduce the eﬀect
of children on women’s level of labor market involvement, public policies oﬀering higher parental
beneﬁts will have the opposite eﬀect — a larger reduction in the level of labor market involvement
following the birth of a child. Second, public policy that increases availability of high quality
child care and child care subsidies for working mothers could eﬃciently reduce the implicit cost of
children. Provision of high quality child care increases the productivity of market inputs into the
production of child quality; other things equal, higher productivity of market inputs reduces the
eﬀect of children on women’s labor supply.
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237A p p e n d i x .
7.1 Estimation algorithm
To estimate the model, we employ Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques. Our approach combines
elements from several sources in the literature. Geweke et al. (1997) propose a Gibbs sampler
algorithm for estimating a panel MNP model where errors follow an AR(1) process. McCulloch
and Rossi (1994) also use a Gibbs sampler to estimate a multiperiod multinomial probit model
with random eﬀects. The general random eﬀects framework has been used for a long time in
Bayesian hierarchical modeling of longitudinal data. In this paper we use the same approach as
in Gilks et al. (1993). Also related, albeit in a continuous setting, is the paper by Chib and
Greenberg (1995) on hierarchical SUR models with correlated errors. Finally, MCMC techniques
for estimating multivariate probit models have been introduced by Chib and Greenberg (1998).
We extend existing work by combining two discrete choice processes and jointly estimating the
parameters of interest in both models.
The data set is an unbalanced panel, with N individuals i =1 ,..,N , each individual i is observed
























































































Using this notation the model becomes
Uit = ˜ Wit˜ β + ˜ Zit˜ γ +
X
m
˜ Kitθml(i,m) + uit
Deﬁne Ui0 = ui0, ˜ Ki0 =[ 0 ] , ˜ Wi0 =[ 0 ] , ˜ Zi0 =[ 0 ] . Finally, let ˙ Uit = Uit − RUit−1;
.
˜ Wit =
˜ Wit − R ˜ Wit−1;
.
˜ Kit = ˜ Kit − R ˜ Kit−1;
.
˜ Zit = ˜ Zit − R ˜ Zit−1.
























,d i =[ di1,...,diT].
The posterior kernel is given by the product of a multivariate normal kernel, the kernel of the
unconditional distribution of the pre-sample error terms, the prior distributions of the parameters,
and an indicator function controlling the ordering and the signs of the latent variables.
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where [V0 (R,Ψ)]jk =
ψjk
ρjρk
























m ∼ W (bm,B m)
The prior distribution for ˜ β is multivariate normal with mean 0 and a variance matrix of 100
times the identity matrix, the prior distribution for ˜ γ is univariate normal with mean 0 and variance
100, the prior distribution for ρ is truncated normal with mean 0.5 and variance 0.25, the prior
distribution for the precision matrix D−1
m is Wishart with parameters bm =3 ,B m =0 .01∗I, where
I is an identity matrix with appropriate dimension.
A seven-step Gibbs sampling algorithm is employed to construct draws from the posterior dis-
tribution.
• Step 1. Draw Uit (i =1 ,....,N,t =1 ,....,Ti)
h
Uit|˜ β,˜ γ,θsk(i,s),D s,R,u i0
i
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To draw from a truncated normal distribution, we used the method proposed by Geweke (1991).
• Step 2. Draw ui0 (i =1 ,....,N).
The conditional distribution
h
ui0|Uit, ˜ β,˜ γ,θsk(i,s),D s,R
i
is only a function of ui1,R,and Ψ.
ui0 ∼ N [Cui1,V 0 (R,Ψ) − CV0 (R,Ψ)C0]
where C =[ V0 (R,Ψ)]R[V0 (R,Ψ)]
−1
25• Step 3. Draw ρ. The conditional distribution distribution
h











Hρ + V −1
ρ
¢−1i
truncated to the hypercube dictated by stationarity, where
Hρ =
⎡
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Due to the truncation, an acceptance step is necessary. Draws are rejected if
¯ ¯ρj
¯ ¯ ≥ 1 for any j,































• Step 4. Draw ˜ βj,j =1 ,2,3,F. Conditional distribution
h
˜ βj|Uit, ˜ γ,θsk(i,s),D s,R,u i0
i
is a


































































• Step 5. Draw ˜ γ.Conditional distribution
h
˜ γ|Uit, ˜ β,θsk(i,s),D s,R,u i0
i
is normal γ ∼ N [g,Γ]




























































where j,l =1 ,2,3,F.
• Step 6. Draw θml for each source of heterogeneity. Conditional distributions
h

























emit = Uit − ˜ Wit˜ β − ˜ Zit˜ γ −
P
g:g6=m
˜ Kitθgl(i,g) . Here,
P
i:l(i,m)=k
means sum for all individuals
observations i for whom factor m is at level k and
P
g:g6=m
means sum for all factors except m.
• Step 7. Draw D−1
m for each source of heterogeneity. Conditional distributions
h
D−1













Convergence is assessed using the method proposed by Gelman and Rubin (1992) with the
modiﬁed correction factor proposed by Brooks and Gelman (1998). One preliminary run of 14000
iterations, with OLS coeﬃcients as starting values, was used to construct starting values for four
independent chains. The starting values were extreme values chosen from the posterior distribution
of the coeﬃcients. The four independent chains, each with 20000 iterations were used to compute
the scale reduction factor.
277.2 Data Appendix
Due to problems with the data we needed to impute some of the data values. The three main
problems we faced were, top-coding of income, missing values for wages and income, and missing
values for hours worked. Here we will brieﬂy outline how we addresses each problem
7.2.1 Top-Coding of Spouse’s Wage, Income from Business and Other Income
The top-coding of income data in the NLSY varies by year. From 1979 to 1984 all income values
above $75,000 were truncated to $75,001. From 1985 to 1900 all income values greater than $100,000
were truncated to $100,001. Since this method produced a downward bias in the mean value of
income, starting in 1989 all values above the cutoﬀ value were replaced with the average of the
true values of income above this level. For our analysis the method used in the later period is
acceptable, where as the method used in the earlier period two periods should not result in a bias
in our parameter estimates. To adjust the top-coded values in the early years so that they match
the values in the latter years we ﬁrst compute the mean income for the top ten percent of non-top
coded values in all years of the data. We then compute the average of the ratio of the top coded
values with the mean of the top ten percent of the non-top coded values, across all of the latter
years of the data (1989-2004). We multiplied this ratio by the mean of the top ten percent of the
non-top coded values in the early years of the data (1979-1984). Finally we replaced the top coded
values in the early years with this new value.
7.2.2 Imputing Missing Wages and Income
Once we ﬁxed the top coding problem we then imputed missing wages and income for all individuals
in our sample. For individuals who had more than three observations we regressed either log wages
or log income on a constant and a time trend and used the results from this regression to impute
the missing data. If only one or two values were available, we imputed the missing values with the
mean deﬂated value of the wage or income. After 1994, NLSY74 was conducted every other year.
We impute the values for the missing post-1994 years by interpolating the deﬂated values of the
wage or income of adjacent years.
7.2.3 Imputing Missing Hours Worked
The NLSY collects information on hours worked each week for every week in the survey. We
aggregate these weekly hours worked into hours worked in each year for individuals in our sample.
If someone has a missing or invalid value for hours worked in a week we impute the value for that
week by taking a weighted mean over all valid values of weekly hours worked in the survey. The
weight we use is 0.5/m where m is the diﬀerence between the current week and the week of the
valid observation.
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32Figure 1. The effect of the first birth on the level of labor market involvement. By education.
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12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrsFigure 2. The components of the total effect of education correponding to the random coefficients and own wage. First birth.
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Rand. Coeff. Own Wage Rand. Coeff. Own WageFigure 3. The components of the total effect of education correponding to the random coefficients and own wage. First birth.
Women with 16 years of education compared with women with 12 years of education Women with 16 years of education compared with women with 12 years of education




Years after first birth
0.12














































































Rand Coeff Own Wage
C. Full time part year D. Part time
Rand. Coeff. Own Wage Rand. Coeff. Own Wage
0.1
Years after first birth
0.1







































































Rand. Coeff. Own Wage Rand. Coeff. Own WageFigure 4. The effect of the second birth on the level of labor market involvement. By education.
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12 yrs 14 yrs 16 yrsFigure 5. The components of the total effect of education correponding to the random coefficients and own wage. Second birth.
Women with 14 years of education compared with women with 12 years of education Women with 14 years of education compared with women with 12 years of education
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Rand. Coeff. Own Wage Rand. Coeff. Own WageFigure 6. The components of the total effect of education correponding to the random coefficients and own wage. Second birth.
Women with 16 years of education compared with women with 12 years of education Women with 16 years of education compared with women with 12 years of education
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Rand. Coeff. Own Wage Rand. Coeff. Own WageFigure 7. The effect of the first birth on the level of labor market involvement. White women with 12 years of education, by preferences.
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Category 1 Category 3Figure 8. The component of the total effect of education correponding to the random coefficients. First birth.
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1979 116 0.00 0.0 72.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.18 0.11 0.03
1980 185 0.22 1507.9 123.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.18 0.14 0.06
1981 263 0.28 2488.6 119.8 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.15 0.19 0.08
1982 340 0.34 2725.6 94.5 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.15 0.18 0.09
1983 402 0.42 3924.8 221.7 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.58 0.16 0.15 0.10
1984 455 0.49 5266.3 313.1 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.58 0.18 0.15 0.09
1985 511 0.55 6157.3 526.6 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.59 0.15 0.18 0.08
1986 561 0.57 8106.4 646.7 0.09 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.62 0.12 0.17 0.10
1987 606 0.62 8749.0 704.5 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.03 0.61 0.14 0.17 0.08
1988 624 0.67 10373.9 907.7 0.11 0.20 0.21 0.06 0.60 0.11 0.19 0.09
1989 631 0.73 11684.7 963.5 0.12 0.23 0.24 0.12 0.59 0.12 0.17 0.12
1990 636 0.77 13015.5 711.6 0.13 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.59 0.10 0.18 0.12
1991 638 0.80 14435.0 668.0 0.13 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.55 0.11 0.20 0.14
1992 639 0.84 15547.3 698.6 0.13 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.55 0.09 0.23 0.14
1993 642 0.86 15981.3 1123.9 0.13 0.27 0.38 0.45 0.52 0.09 0.22 0.16
1994 643 0.89 18432.9 2213.6 0.13 0.26 0.39 0.57 0.52 0.08 0.22 0.19
1995 644 0.91 18083.1 2066.9 0.12 0.25 0.40 0.70 0.53 0.07 0.21 0.19
1996 644 0.93 20263.3 2104.9 0.10 0.22 0.39 0.83 0.49 0.09 0.23 0.19
1997 645 0.94 19878.5 1481.3 0.09 0.19 0.38 0.96 0.50 0.07 0.23 0.20
1998 645 0.95 21807.5 2149.2 0.09 0.18 0.34 1.09 0.52 0.05 0.23 0.20
1999 645 0.96 19960.9 2291.8 0.06 0.15 0.31 1.22 0.52 0.05 0.23 0.21
2000 645 0.97 23862.0 2768.1 0.06 0.12 0.27 1.34 0.51 0.04 0.24 0.20
2001 645 0.98 22397.7 1829.4 0.03 0.08 0.24 1.44 0.53 0.04 0.24 0.19
2002 645 0.99 24945.3 2838.3 0.03 0.06 0.20 1.53 0.52 0.06 0.24 0.18
2003 645 1.00 23925.9 2315.4 0.02 0.05 0.14 1.61 0.51 0.06 0.22 0.21
Education     % Race          % Mother's LM status     % Parents' education       %
<=12yrs 36.4 White 69.9 Full-time 31.2 None college 74.6
13-15yrs 26.7 Black 13.8 Other 68.8 One college 16.0
>=16 yrs 36.9 Hispanic 16.3 Both college 9.5
B. Time-Invariant Personal Characteristics and Family Backgound Variables
Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Variables in the Data Set
A. Time-Varying Characteristics
Number of Children per Woman 
at Risk, by Age Labor Market Status<=12yrs 13-15yrs >=16 yrs
A. Number of children
   Average 1.966 1.703 1.731
   Probability Distribution
                        0 0.145 0.174 0.223
                        1 0.136 0.221 0.126
                        2 0.481 0.413 0.450
                        3 0.149 0.140 0.134
                        4 0.060 0.029 0.050
                        5 0.021 0.017 0.008
                        >5 0.009 0.006 0.008
B. Timing of marriage
   Average number of years from entry 4.643 4.640 4.588
C. Timing of the first birth
   Average number of years from marriage 2.637 3.641 3.468
D. The level of labor market involvement before the first birth
      Participation 0.962 0.973 0.981
        Full Time 0.704 0.751 0.805
        Full time part year 0.125 0.100 0.090
        Part time 0.133 0.122 0.086
E. The level of labor market involvement after the first birth, women with one child
      Participation 0.813 0.883 0.943
        Full Time 0.548 0.607 0.749
        Full time part year 0.083 0.089 0.035
        Part time 0.182 0.188 0.159
F. The level of labor market involvement after the second birth, women with two children
      Participation 0.830 0.754 0.820
        Full Time 0.475 0.401 0.450
        Full time part year 0.094 0.064 0.055
        Part time 0.261 0.289 0.314
Table 2. Fertility and Labor Market Outcomes, by Education
EducationEquation
Mean PSTD Mean PSTD Mean PSTD Mean PSTD
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 0.100 0.266 -0.831 0.196 -1.475 0.248 -1.398 0.071
Children age 0-1 -1.429 0.199 -0.975 0.184 -0.128 0.168 0.285 0.051
Children age 2-4 -1.058 0.201 -0.868 0.173 -0.050 0.137 -0.068 0.050
Children age 5+ -0.530 0.155 -0.429 0.101 0.218 0.093 -0.781 0.069
Married -1.142 0.153 -0.722 0.129 -0.797 0.167
Spouse's wage -0.025 0.012 -0.018 0.010 -0.010 0.012
Other income -0.017 0.014 -0.039 0.012 -0.017 0.013 0.029 0.006
Region
North East 0.288 0.216 0.036 0.147 0.139 0.194 -0.043 0.063
North Central 0.491 0.211 0.336 0.139 0.346 0.185 0.088 0.064
South 0.287 0.200 -0.038 0.132 -0.036 0.176 -0.072 0.062
Urban 0.218 0.111 0.117 0.088 0.093 0.107 0.004 0.047
Wage 0.702 0.017 0.702 0.017 0.702 0.017
Wage*Children age 0-1 -0.015 0.030 -0.015 0.030 -0.015 0.030
Wage*Children age 2-4 -0.046 0.022 -0.046 0.022 -0.046 0.022
Wage*Children age 5+  -0.097 0.010 -0.097 0.010 -0.097 0.010
Sibling with children 0.028 0.012
ρ 0.701 0.018 0.017 0.045 0.724 0.028 -0.278 0.026
Table 3. Estimation Results. Posterior Means and Standard Deviations for the Coefficients.
Full Time - Nonwork Full Time Part Year - Nonwork Part Time - Nonwork FertilityEquation
CT  0-1 2-4 5+ CT 0-1 2-4 5+ CT 0-1 2-4 5+ CT 0-1 2-4 5+
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
<=12yrs -0.330 0.229 0.245 0.179 0.004 0.128 0.174 0.064 0.092 -0.041 0.039 0.015 0.046 -0.032 0.031 -0.003
13-15yrs 0.142 -0.042 -0.099 -0.048 0.031 -0.029 -0.065 -0.033 -0.013 0.000 0.002 -0.021 -0.014 0.008 -0.015 0.001
>=16 yrs 0.188 -0.187 -0.145 -0.130 -0.035 -0.099 -0.109 -0.031 -0.078 0.041 -0.042 0.007 -0.032 0.025 -0.015 0.002
White 0.125 -0.258 -0.431 -0.325 -0.122 -0.203 -0.124 -0.082 -0.007 0.015 0.038 0.059 -0.044 -0.008 0.025 -0.012
Black -0.009 0.112 0.254 0.247 0.049 0.064 0.064 0.043 -0.002 0.009 -0.010 -0.021 -0.034 0.000 -0.007 0.005
Hispanic -0.115 0.146 0.177 0.078 0.073 0.139 0.060 0.039 0.009 -0.023 -0.028 -0.038 0.078 0.008 -0.018 0.007
Full-time 0.139 0.004 0.082 -0.002 0.035 -0.069 0.006 -0.013 -0.003 0.002 -0.010 0.024 0.001 -0.006 0.008 -0.002
Other -0.139 -0.004 -0.082 0.002 -0.035 0.069 -0.006 0.013 0.003 -0.002 0.010 -0.024 -0.001 0.006 -0.008 0.002
None college 0.156 0.175 0.036 0.281 0.169 -0.007 0.034 0.042 0.015 -0.036 -0.010 0.026 -0.013 -0.013 -0.018 -0.014
One college 0.008 0.032 -0.048 0.006 0.010 -0.035 -0.017 -0.032 0.001 0.041 0.016 -0.023 0.004 -0.004 0.018 -0.020
Both college -0.164 -0.207 0.012 -0.287 -0.178 0.042 -0.017 -0.010 -0.016 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 0.009 0.017 0.000 0.034
Table 4. Posterior Means of Random Coefficients. Observed Heterogeneity.
Full Time - Nonwork Full Time Part Year - Nonwork Part Time - Nonwork Fertility
Children Children Children Children
NOTE:   CT=Constant term; Children 0-1=Number of children 0 to 1years old; Children 2-4=Number of children 2 to 4 years old; Children 5+=Number of children five years old and older.  Age is age at last birthday.  
Education
Race
Respondent's Mother's labor market status
Parents' educationCT  0-1 2-4 5+ CT 0-1 2-4 5+ CT 0-1 2-4 5+ CT 0-1 2-4 5+
FT-NW CT 1 -0.082 -0.080 -0.298 0.917 0.133 -0.031 -0.362 0.550 -0.178 -0.164 -0.434 0.051 -0.259 -0.172 -0.266
Children 0-1 1 0.990 0.926 0.084 0.960 0.976 0.888 -0.099 0.747 0.845 0.343 0.463 -0.551 -0.946 0.095
Children 2-4 1 0.936 0.119 0.937 0.978 0.892 -0.008 0.663 0.778 0.254 0.513 -0.588 -0.936 0.129
Children 5+ 1 -0.143 0.796 0.858 0.987 -0.174 0.682 0.782 0.426 0.310 -0.343 -0.838 0.028
FP-NW CT 1 0.276 0.187 -0.221 0.670 -0.222 -0.143 -0.562 0.422 -0.586 -0.267 0.059
Children 0-1 1 0.964 0.748 -0.051 0.751 0.837 0.288 0.509 -0.643 -0.950 0.105
Children 2-4 1 0.805 0.012 0.652 0.766 0.203 0.614 -0.693 -0.918 0.231
Children 5+ 1 -0.297 0.719 0.808 0.531 0.276 -0.292 -0.775 0.059
PT-NW CT 1 -0.661 -0.564 -0.930 0.240 -0.292 -0.074 -0.094
Children 0-1 1 0.981 0.830 0.048 -0.147 -0.683 -0.071
Children 2-4 1 0.761 0.192 -0.288 -0.769 0.017
Children 5+ 1 -0.249 0.240 -0.219 -0.075
Fertility CT 1 -0.963 -0.328 0.836
Children 0-1 1 0.479 -0.694
Children 2-4 1 0.141
Children 5+ 1
NOTE: FT = Full time; FP = Full time part year; PT = Part time; NW = Nonwork; CT = Constant term; Children 0-1 = Number of children 0 to 1years old; Children 2-4 = 
Number of children 2 to 4 years old; Children 5+ = Number of children five years old and older.  Age is age at last birthday.  
Table 5. Posterior Correlation Matrix for the Effects of Unobserved Individual Heterogeneity
FT-NW FP-NW PT-NW Fertility
Children Children Children Children year 1  year 2  year 3  year 4  year 5  year 6  year 7  year 8  year 9  year 10 year 11 year 12 year 13 year 14 year 15
Marital Status 011111111111111













NOTE: Children 0-1=Number of children 0 to 1years old; Children 2-4=Number of children 2 to 4 
years old; Children 5+=Number of children five years old and older
Table 6. Simulation Scenarios
Fertility histories
2. One child born in year 3
3. Two children born in years 3 and 9Prob. % of Part. Prob. % of Part. Prob. % of Part.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Participation 0.913 0.966 0.977
    Full time 0.567 0.621 0.715 0.740 0.745 0.762
    Full time part year 0.207 0.226 0.163 0.169 0.158 0.161
    Part time 0.139 0.152 0.088 0.091 0.074 0.076
Rand. Coeff. Wage Rand. Coeff. Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Participation 0.036 0.017 0.035 0.029
    Full time 0.131 0.016 0.154 0.024
    Full time part year  -0.047 0.003 -0.062 0.013
    Part time -0.048 -0.003 -0.057 -0.008
Table 7b. The components of the total effect of education correponding to
 the random coefficients and own wage. 
Educ. 12 yrs/Educ. 14 yrs Educ. 12 yrs/Educ. 16 yrs
Table 7a. The Level of Labor Market Involvement Before the Birth of the First Child, by Education
Educ. 12 yrs Educ. 14 yrs Educ. 16 yrsProb. % of Part. Prob. % of Part.
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Participation 0.918 0.898
    Full time 0.610 0.665 0.534 0.594
    Full time part year  0.184 0.200 0.227 0.252
    Part time 0.124 0.135 0.138 0.153
Note: Women in category 1 strongly disagree with statements implying that the place of a woman is in the household
          Women in category 3 strongly agree with statements implying that the place of a woman is in the household
Table 8. The Level of Labor Market Involvement Before the Birth of the First Child
White Women with 12 Years of Education, by Preferences
Category 1 Category 3Appendix Table 1. The relationship between fertility and the number of siblings with children.
Estimation results of OLS regression with the number of children born between 1979 and 2003
Independent Variable
Std. Err Std. Err Std. Err
Constant 1.672 ** 0.064 1.611 ** 0.086 1.702 ** 0.122
Change in the number 
of siblings with children 0.155 ** 0.046 0.130 ** 0.052 0.101 * 0.052
Number of siblings 0.025 0.023 0.031 0.025
Education
      <=12yrs (omitted)
      13-15yrs -0.146 0.128
       >15 yrs -0.168 0.130
Race
      White (omitted)
      Black  -0.321 ** 0.151
      Hispanic 0.194 0.141
Parents' education
      None Collge (omitted)
      One College 0.025 0.144
      Both College 0.258 0.185
Observations
Adjusted R-square
NOTE: ** significant at 95% level of confidence; * significant at 90% level of confidence
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff Coeff Coeff
645 645 645
0.016 0.016 0.026